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LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION: BALANCING CRIME 
FIGHTING NEEDS AND PRIVACY RIGHTS 
By Nancy K. Oliver* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rapid technological developments over the last twenty-five years 
have made cellular telephone location information ubiquitous and 
increasingly more detailed. 1 As a result, these developments have 
outpaced federal legislative solutions needed to address privacy 
concerns, on the one hand, and clarify standards for law enforcement 
access to such information, on the other. 2 At the same time, federal 
courts from coast to coast have sought to apply appropriate legal 
standards governed by these existing outdated statutory schemes and 
Fourth Amendment rights in determining law enforcement's access to 
information critical for criminal investigations and the fight against 
violent crime.3 To further complicate the issues, as the technology 
has developed, the location information at issue before the courts has 
ranged from marginally accurate geographic historical data, to that 
which is real time and highly accurate, to within feet of the specific 
device's location.4 Moreover, the accuracy of the information varies 
with the service provider and the cellular device.5 The resulting 
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Yet, just as technology evolves, so does the criminal element's 
sophistication in utilizing it to evade detection by law enforcement. 
For example, drug trafficking organizations have replaced a key 
resource, the beepers and pagers of the past, with the cell phones of 
today.6 And more recently, readily available prepaid cell phones add 
the layer of anonymity to the criminal's essential tool for facilitating 
his crimes.7 
Courts and Congress alike, along with scholars and privacy groups, 
have realized the need for legislative solutions to diverse issues raised 
by this advancing technology.8 Although some courts and scholars 
have concluded that real-time location data should only be accessible 
on a showing of probable cause, that conclusion has only led to the 
need for a definition of "probable cause" in the context of obtaining 
location information.9 However, the call for a probable cause 
standard for obtaining accurate, real-time location information 
requires further debate in the context of law enforcement 
investigative realities rather than merely assumed as a reactionary, 
prophylactic measure driven by Orwellian fears. 
6. See Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause Courts to Reconsider 
Fourth Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. MEM. L. REv. 233, 254 
(2010). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing drug 
trafficking organization's use of prepaid phones); Lewis Medlock, Prepaid Cell 
Phones: The New Growth Industry, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.coml 
?Prepaid-Cell-Phones:-The-New-Growth-Industry&id=6192322 (last visited May 31, 
2013) (describing growth in prepaid cell phones); Edward Lane, Texas Senator 
Cornyn Proposes Law to Register Prepaid Cell Phones to Fight Criminals, THE 
EXAMINER (June 7, 20 I 0), http://www.examiner.comlarticle/texas-senator-comyn-
proposes-Iaw-to-register-prepaid-cell-phones-to-fight-criminals (discussing Senator 
Comyn's efforts to require registration of prepaid cell phones). 
8. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of probable 
cause and the potential issues of "retroactive unconstitutionality" raised by the 
"mosaic" theory); see, e.g., In re United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of 
Location Information for a Specified Wireless Telephone, 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 553-
56 [hereinafter Gauvey Order] (discussing the explosion of articles on cell site 
tracking by law enforcement, congressional hearings, and legislative proposals). Due 
to the long and cumbersome nature of the titles of cases dealing with applications for 
CSLI as well as the fact that they are all titled virtually the same, the author will take a 
cue from Magistrate Judge Austin from the Western District of Texas and use the 
following shorthand form to refer to the decisions in those cases: "[Judge] Order" 
followed by the citation to the reporting service. 
9. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text. 
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II. A SHORT PRIMER ON CELL PHONE LOCATION 
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As any "smart" phone owner lO is well aware, location infonnation 
is integral to many, if not most, cell phones and the various 
applications users install on them to enhance their day-to-day lives. 
Facebook and Foursquare "friends" can let each other know their 
exact location at any given moment, while other applications infonn 
users of dining, shopping, and entertainment opportunities nearby.ll 
Before the explosion of cell phones and call forwarding technology 
an individual's phone number, by definition, told a caller the person's 
location when the call was answered. Today, a call may rouse our 
friend or colleague on the other side of the globe. 
Unlike conventional land or wire-line telephones, cellular phones 
use radio waves to communicate with the cellular service providers' 
network of radio base stations. 12 The radio base station or tower 
communicates with the cell phone whenever a call is placed or 
received, as well as periodically when the cell phone automatically 
signals or identifies itself to the base station.13 
With regard to cell phone location infonnation, two different 
technologies are relevant. First, the cell phone handset may contain 
global positioning system (GPS) hardware that detennines the cell 
phone's location-latitude and longitude-based on the phone's 
communication with satellites. 14 GPS location infonnation calculated 
by the phone's handset, however, mayor may not be sent to the 
cellular network or another third party, and is only reliable when the 
handset is outdoors and can "see" the GPS satellites. 15 Furthennore, 
the cellular service provider does not require GPS information to 
provide the cell phone service. 16 
The second type of technology, "network-based" location 
technology, does not depend on satellites or GPS technology and is 
10. As of February 2012, 50% of American adults own a smart phone. Smart phones 
Account for Half of all Mobile Phones, Dominate New Phone Purchases in the US, 
NIELSEN WIRE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/us/eninewswire/2012/ 
smartphones-account-for-half-of-all-mobile-phones-dominate-new-phone-purchases-
in-the-us.html. 
II. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of 
Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REv. 681, 708 (2011). 
12. ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 20 (statement of Blaze). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 21. 
15. Id.at22. 
16. Id. at 14. 
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based on infonnation collected and analyzed by the cell phone 
providers' base stations.17 As noted above, the user's cell handset 
uses radio waves to communicate with the base stations whenever 
making or receiving a call, as well as when it registers or identifies 
itself to the base station as it moves geographically throughout the 
system. Technically, the radio base stations, also known as "cell 
sites," are generally located on a cell "tower.,,18 However, base 
stations are no longer limited to the tall three-sided radio towers 
commonly seen along the roadways; they may be mounted indoors as 
well and may be as small as a conventional stereo speaker. 19 
In order to route incoming or outgoing calls, the cellular network 
must keep track of the sector in which the phone is located.20 The 
accuracy of the location infonnation varies based on a number of 
factors, but generally becomes more accurate with the increasing 
geographic density of the towers and their cell sites and the 
corresponding decrease in the actual geographic area serviced by any 
particular cell site, i.e., the decreasing size of the cell sector.21 
According to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, 
the number of cell sites has more than doubled between June 2002 
and June 2012.22 
In addition to decreasing cell site size, other technology available 
to cellular providers can pinpoint a phone's latitude and longitude 
within fifty meters or less by correlating the time and angle of arrival 
of the handset's signal as it moves to the different cell sites, 
regardless of whether calls are made or received as long as the phone 
is turned on.23 Although the capabilities and retention practices of 
carriers vary, as noted by Professor Blaze in his testimony during 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act refonn hearings, detailed 
location data provides valuable information to the carriers, and the 
trend of cellular providers to collect and maintain detailed location 
17. Id. at23. 
18. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress 
Should Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 126 (2012). 
19. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S. D. Tex. 
2010). 
20. ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 14 (testimony of Blaze). 
21. Id. at 23-24. 
22. 50 Wireless Quick Facts, CELLULAR TELECOMM. INDUST. ASS'N, http://www.ctia.org/ 
advocacy/researchlindex.cfrnlaidll0323 (last visited May 31, 2013). 
23. ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 26 (statement of Blaze). 
2013] Balancing Crime Fighting Needs & Privacy 489 
records can be expected to continue as the technology needed to do 
so continues to develop. 24 
Location information can be generally categorized into 3 basic 
types: (1) information routinely collected by the cellular provider;25 
(2) information collected by the cellular provider upon request by law 
enforcement;26 and (3) information that law enforcement collects 
independently of the cellular provider.27 At a minimum, cellular 
service providers record and retain cell site location information 
(CSLI) in the regular course of their business when a call is placed or 
received.28 The information is available on a historical as well as 
prospective or real-time basis. However, the terms "historical" and 
"prospective" can be ambiguous.29 Historical CSLI refers to 
information recorded and stored by the service provider prior to the 
issuance of a court order.30 The terms "prospective" and "real-time" 
are not synonymous, although they are frequently used 
interchangeably. 31 Real-time CSLI is that which the government uses 
to identify the location of the device at the moment it is transmitted 
and is a subset of prospective information, which is created anytime 
after the date of the court order.32 
In addition to obtaining the CSLI for a particular cell number, a 
cellular provider can also provide all the cellular numbers and 
subscriber information recorded by a particular cell site or tower 
during a given time frame. 33 
24. Id. at 27-28. Location data is useful in identifying network deficiencies, 
redundancies, and customer usage, as well as marketing and developing new services; 
"service providers record everything essentially forever." Id. at 16. 
25. Id. at 57 (testimony of Richard Littlehale, Assistant Special Agent, Tenn. Bureau of 
Investigation). 
26. See id. 
27. See id. at 57-58. 
28. United States v. Jones, No. 05-0386, 2012 WL 6443136, at *2 (D. D.C. Dec. 14, 
2012). 
29. ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 86 (testimony of Stephen Smith, United States 
Magistrate Judge). 
30. In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use ofa Pen Register 
and a Caller Identification Sys. On Tel. Numbers, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 
2005). 
31. ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 86 (testimony of Smith) (citing In re United States for 
an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller 
Identification Sys. On Tel. Numbers. 402 F. Supp 2d 597,599 & n.5 (D. Md. 2005). 
32. Id. 
33. See, e.g., In re The United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Nos. 
C-12-670M, C-12-671M, C-12-672M, C-12-673M, 2012 WL 4717778, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex. Sept. 26,2012) [hereinafter Owsley Order]. 
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The collection of more accurate location data based on the arrival 
of the handset's radio signals is available prospectively during a 911 
call34 and may be available to law enforcement when the carrier is 
asked to collect it.35 Nevertheless, there is a growing trend for 
cellular providers to collect and maintain more accurate location 
information for their own purposes. Further, and most intrusively, 
law enforcement can use investigative tools that force a cell phone to 
send a registration signal to the investigative device and thereby 
identify the cell sector in which the phone is 10cated.36 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that technology providing 
precise cell phone location information has changed dramatically and 
is likely to continue to do so. In addition, the accuracy and 
availability of location data will vary geographically and across 
service providers. 
III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) was enacted in 1986 as 
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.37 Although 
the SCA does not explicitly refer to historical CSLI,38 historical CSLI 
is a "record or other information pertaining to a subscriber. . . or 
customer of [a provider of electronic communication service],,,39 and 
is subject to disclosure under 18 U.S.c. § 2703(c) and (d). As such, 
CSLI does not contain the content of any communication.40 As 
originally enacted, the SCA provided for court ordered disclosure 
"only if the governmental entity show[ ed] that there [was] reason to 
believe ... the records or other information sought[] [were] relevant 
to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.,,41 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA) and amended the SCA to the current 
34. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 128-29. 
35. Id. at 128. 
36. The law enforcement technique utilizes "triggerfish" technology. See William 
Curtiss, Triggering a Closer Review: Direct Acquisition of Cell Site Location 
Tracking Information and the Argumentfor Consistency Across Statutory Regimes, 45 
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 139, 165-67 (2013). 
37. In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Comrn'n Servo to 
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 306 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Sloviter 
Order] (citing Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 
1848,1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2006))). 
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11. 
39. Sloviter Order, 620 F.3d at 307-08. 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(I). 
41. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 207, 108 Stat. 1848, 1862 (1986) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)) (emphasis added). 
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intermediate standard.42 The SCA now provides that a court may 
order disclosure of CSLI by the service provider if the government 
"offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the ... information sought [is] 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.,,43 The 
SCA also provides other mechanisms for disclosure of records and 
information pertaining to the subscriber, including pursuant to a 
warrant or the subscriber's consent.44 
In addition to amending the SCA, CALEA amended § 3121 of Title 
18 of the United States Code-the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace 
Devices Statute-and explicitly prohibited acquiring a subscriber's 
CSLI "solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and 
trace devices.'>45 The Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices 
Statute authorizes the government to seek a court order for the 
installation of a pen register or a trap and trace device based on a 
certification that the "information likely to be obtained is relevant to 
an ongoing criminal investigation.'>46 The terms "pen register" and 
"trap and trace device" are defined by the statute and include 
"dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information.,,47 In 
general terms, a pen register device records the numbers dialed-
outgoing calls-and a trap and trace device records caller 
identifications-the numbers assigned to incoming calls.48 
As noted above, historical CSLI can be disclosed under the SeA as 
a record or other information pertaining to the service provider's 
42. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 
207, 108 Stat. 4279, 4292 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 u.s.c. § 2703(d)); see 
also Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 314 (noting that CALEA established 
intermediate standard). 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(E). 
45. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006); 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act § 103, 47 U.S.c. § 1002 
(2006). The broader language provides that "with regard to information acquired 
solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined 
in section 3127 of title 18, United States Code), such call-identifying information shall 
not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber 
(except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone 
number)." ld. 
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), (4). 
48. H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING 
COMPUTERS AND OBTAfNfNG ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE fN CRIMINAL INVESTIGA nONS 153, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminaVcybercrime/docs/ssmanuaI2009.pdf (last 
visited May 31, 2013). 
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subscriber or customer.49 In order to obtain real-time infonnation or 
infonnation captured prospectively (after the date of a court order), 
however, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) developed a "hybrid 
theory" drawing on the combined authority of the Pen Registers and 
Trap and Trace Devices Statute and orders issued under § 2703(d) of 
Title 18.50 Because CSLI also meets the definition of "dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling infonnation,,,51 the Pen Registers 
and Trap and Trace Devices Statute applies, but as noted above, it 
cannot be the sole authority for location infonnation.52 By combining 
the two statutes, the government could obtain a court order for 
prospective and real-time CSLI by applying both standards. 53 
Pursuant to the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Statute, the 
government certifies that the infonnation likely to be obtained is 
relevant to the investigation, and pursuant to § 2703( d), the 
government offers "specific and articulable facts showing that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the ... infonnation sought [is] 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.,,54 As 
discussed in more detail below, the hybrid theory met with mixed 
results among federal magistrate and district courtjudges.55 
In addition to the statutory authorities discussed above, CSLI may 
also be disclosed pursuant to a Rule 41 probable cause warrant or a 
wiretap order under Title III. 56 The relevant standards that the 
government must meet to acquire CSLI, therefore, range from: (1) 
demonstrating specific and articulable facts showing reasonable 
grounds that the infonnation is relevant and material to the 
investigation (SCA);57 (2) number one, plus a mere certification-
rather than demonstration-that the infonnation is likely to be 
relevant (SCA plus the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices 
Statute);58 (3) demonstrating probable cause to believe that the 
infonnation will reveal "evidence of a crime," "contraband, fruits of 
[a] crime," or "property designed for use, intended for use, or used in 
committing a crime" (Rule 41 );59 or (4) number three plus other 
requirements such as demonstrating that other less intrusive 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 37-4l. 
50. JARRETT ET AL., supra note 48, at 160. 
51. Id. 
52. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
53. See JARRETT ET AL., supra note 48, at 160. 
54. Id. 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70. 
56. FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(d)(I); 18 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). 
57. 18 U.S.c. § 2703(d) (2006). 
58. 18 U.S.c. § 3123(a)(I) (2006). 
59. FED. R. CRlM. P. 41 (c)(l)-{3). 
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investigative techniques have been tried and have failed, or why such 
methods reasonably appear unlike to succeed if tried, or would be too 
dangerous (Title III "super warrant,,).60 
Although not directly relevant to obtaining CSLI, it is interesting to 
note that the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Statute 
allows the government to capture call information from within the 
private space of the home, which historically has revealed the 
location of the caller or the one receiving the call on a much lower 
standard-that is, the mere certification that the information is 
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.61 
IV. JUDICIAL HODGEPODGE 
The majority of the jurisprudence addressing the government's 
access to CSLI is provided by the hardworking United States 
Magistrate Judges across the country whose duties include issuing 
search warrants and other orders related to criminal investigations.62 
As of the end of 2012, only one reported circuit court case has dealt 
explicitly with the appropriateness of the SCA's intermediate 
standard for obtaining CSLI.63 The breadth of conflict found in the 
existing case law highlights the need for congressional clarification.64 
In early 2008, Magistrate Judge Lenihan summarized the then state 
of the case law on CSLI in a decision discussing both prospective and 
historical CSLI on behalf of all the magistrate judges in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania.65 As Judge Lenihan pointed out, a 
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2006). "The federal wiretap statute, originally passed in 1968 
and sometimes called 'Title III' or the Wiretap Act, requires the police to get a 
wiretap order-often called a 'super-warrant' because it is even harder to get than a 
regular search warrant-before they monitor or record your communications." 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Wiretapping Law Protections, SURVEILLANCE 
SELF-DEF., https:llssd.eff.orglwire/govtlwiretapping-protections (last visited May 31, 
2013). 
61. See infra text accompanying note 98. 
62. As noted in Magistrate Judge Smith's testimony, there are over 500 magistrate judges 
in the federal district courts whose duties include hearing civil matters and almost all 
criminal matters except conducting felony trials. ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 79 
(statement of United States Mag. J. Smith). 
63. See Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 314. 
64. Because this issue has generated voluminous case law, the author does not attempt to 
provide an analysis including all available cases, but rather has endeavored to focus 
on cases that will enhance further discussion about (at least some of) the critical 
issues. See cases cited infra note 67. 
65. See In re The United States for an Order Directing a Provider ofElec. Commc'n Servo 
to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 543 F. Supp. 2d 585, 599--600 (W.D. Pa. 2008) 
[hereinafter Lenihan Order]. As discussed more fully below, the Court of Appeals for 
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"significant majority" of the courts had denied the government access 
to prospective and real-time location information based on the hybrid 
theory, which, as noted above, combines the authority under the Pen 
Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Statute and the SCA.66 Even 
magistrate judges within the same district disagreed over the 
applicable standard for obtaining prospective CSLI.67 With regard to 
historical CSLI, decisions granting the government access had, for 
the most part, concluded without analysis or merely suggested that 
the government could obtain CSLI under the SCA.68 Judge Lenihan 
distinguished the reported opinions of two district court judges that 
had specifically addressed and allowed the government to obtain 
historical CSLI under the SCA.69 Judge Lenihan held, in part, that 
because the cell phone was a "tracking device" under 18 U.S.C. § 
3117, the communications from which are expressly excluded from 
the SCA, the government could only obtain the CSLI, whether 
the Third Circuit vacated Judge Lenihan's order in Sloviter Order, supra note 37. In 
discussing Judge Lenihan's opinion, the court began by noting that the fact that the 
opinion was joined by the other district court magistrate judges was "unique in the 
author's experience of more than three decades on this court and demonstrates the 
impressive level of support Magistrate Judge Lenihan's opinion has among her 
colleagues .... " Id. at 308. 
66. See Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 599; supra notes 4~I. 
67. Compare In re The United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications 
Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 
435,488 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (accepting hybrid theory), with In re The United States for 
an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 2006 WL 
468300, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006) (rejecting hybrid theory and noting that 
"prospective cell site location information has been the subject of at least ten prior 
decisions by Magistrate Judges in this Circuit and around the country"). Ultimately, 
the disagreement in the Southern District of New York was resolved in favor of the 
hybrid theory by Judge Kaplan in In re The United States for an Order for Prospective 
Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 463 
(S.D.N.Y.2006). However, Judge McMahon expressly disagreed with Judge Kaplan 
in In re The United States for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register with, Caller 
Identification Device Cell Site Location Auth. on a Cellular Tel., 2009 WL 159187, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009), rmding that CSLI did not constitute a record and that it 
was a tracking device. 
68. See Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 600; see also ECPA Hearing, supra note 1 
(statement of United States Mag. J. Smith). 
69. Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 604-05 n.53 (citing In re The United States for 
Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. 
Mass. 2007) [hereinafter Stearns Order]; In re The United States for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D. Tex. 
2007) [hereinafter Rosenthal Order]). 
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prospective or historical, with a warrant pursuant to a showing of 
probable cause.70 
Prior to Judge Lenihan's opinion, Judge Steams from the District 
of Massachusetts and Judge Rosenthal from the Southern District of 
Texas had overturned magistrate judges' decisions refusing access to 
CSLI without a probable cause warrant.71 Both specifically 
addressed the required standard and upheld the government's access 
to CSLI based on the government's proffer of specific and articulable 
facts demonstrating reasonable grounds that the information was 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation under the 
SCA.72 Judge Steams, in allowing the disclosure of historical CSLI, 
first determined that the SCA applies to historical CSLI.73 The judge 
then went on to determine that a demonstration of probable cause 
under the Fourth Amendment was not required because the 
government sought only historical information about the subject's 
location in the past.74 Further, the court noted that even if the 
government sought prospective information that allowed the 
government to "track" the cell phone into a protected area such as the 
home, "there is nothing presumptively illegal about the possession of 
a cellular phone," and "[t]he most that the 'tracked' cell phone might 
reveal is that its owner might presently be found in the home.,,75 The 
court went on to conclude that "[t]here is nothing, however, about 
that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what 
could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from 
physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful 
that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment 
implication whatsoever.,,76 
Following Judge Steams' decision, Judge Rosenthal-noting the 
division among magistrate judges and district court judges and the 
need for additional guidance to the courts and prosecutors-issued an 
opinion, which discussed access to both prospective and historical 
CSLI. 77 Judge Rosenthal began by finding that the government had 
met its statutory burdens under both the Pen Registers and Trap and 
70. Id at 589, 594-95, 601-607. 
71. Stearns Order, supra note 69, at 81-82; Rosenthal Order, supra note 69, at 412, 418. 
72. See Stearns Order, supra note 69, at 81-82 (allowing disclosure of historical CSLI); 
Rosenthal Order, supra note 69, at 418 (allowing disclosure of both historical and 
prospective CSLI, based on limited information sought by the government). 
73. Stearns Order, supra note 69, at 79-80. 
74. Id. at 81. 
75. Id 
76. Id 
77. Rosenthal Order, supra note 69, at 412-13. 
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Trace Devices Statute as well as the SCA by certifying that the 
information likely to be obtained was relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation and by providing specific and articulable facts showing 
reasonable grounds that the information sought was relevant and 
material to the investigation, respectively.78 The judge then went on 
to address whether the government had to demonstrate the higher 
standard of probable cause.79 
Judge Rosenthal acknowledged other courts' concerns that CSLI 
might be used to tum the cell phone into a tracking device.80 He 
noted, however, that the cases granting applications for CSLI did so 
on a limited basis to "minimiz[ e] the concern that a cell phone could 
be used as a kind of 'tracking device. ",81 Just as in prior cases from 
the Southern District of New York and the Western District of 
Louisiana, which were based on similar facts and resulted in the grant 
of the government's request,82 in the case before Judge Rosenthal, the 
government did not seek information from multiple towers (thus 
allowing triangulation), GPS activation, or other information that 
would allow continuous tracking when the cell phone was not placing 
a call.83 The court further required that the information could only be 
provided to the government after the cellular service provider 
recorded and stored the information.84 
In response to Magistrate Judge Lenihan's 2008 decision and 
following an appeal in which the district court affirmed the decision 
without analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued the 
first appellate decision to address whether a court can deny the 
government's access to historical CSLI once the government has met 
its burden under the SCA. 85 In sum, the court rejected Judge 
78. Id. at 414-18. 
79. Id. at414. 
80. Jd. at 415. 
81. Id. at 415-16 (quoting In re The United States for an Order (I) Authorizing the 
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
[hereinafter Rosenthal I Order]). 
82. Id. at416. 
83. Id. at417-18. 
84. Id. at 419. 
85. Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 305-06. Prior to the Third Circuit opinion, the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected suppression of cell site location information 
obtained when an agent dialed the suspect's cell number after losing visual contact 
with him. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). However, the 
case did not involve access to CSLI under the SCA, but rather challenges under Title 
III, 18 U.S.c. § 3117, and the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 949. Most notably, the court 
found that 
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Lenihan's reasoning and her interpretation of the legislative history 
and held that the government was not required to demonstrate 
probable cause and could obtain historical CSLI based on the SCA's 
intermediate standard. 86 In reaching its decision, the court noted that 
even if historical CSLI allowed an inference of the present or future 
location of a person, and thus resembled a tracking device, the 
"privacy interests at issue [in Fourth Amendment precedents] are 
confmed to the interior of the home" and such privacy issues were 
not present in the record before the court.87 The court, therefore, 
rejected Judge Lenihan's conclusion "that CSLI by definition, should 
be considered information from a tracking device that, for that 
reason, requires probable cause for its production.,,88 
Although the Third Circuit affirmed the government's access to 
historical CSLI under the SCA,89 the court did not stop there. The 
court rejected the government's argument that the court is required to 
issue an order for CSLI if the government meets its burden of 
providing specific and articulable facts showing reasonable grounds 
to believe that the information sought is relevant and material to the 
ongoing criminal investigation.90 First, the court looked to the 
language of 18 V.S.c. § 2703(d) that states "a 'court order for 
disclosure. .. may be issued by any court... of competent 
jurisdiction and shall issue only if the [above] intermediate standard 
is met.,,91 The court found that this is a permissive standard that sets 
a necessary but not automatically sufficient condition.92 Further, 
since § 2703( c)(1 )(A) provides the option for disclosure of the 
information pursuant to a warrant, the court was "unwilling to 
remove that option" and held that magistrate judges have the 
discretion to reqUire a warrant showing probable cause.93 
[T]he distinction between the cell-site data and Gamer's location is 
not legally significant under the particular facts of this case. Here, 
the cell-site data is simply a proxy for Gamer's visually observable 
location. But as previously noted, Gamer had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his movements along public highways. 
Id. at 951. Similarly, in United States v. Skinner, the Sixth Circuit rejected a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to CSLI obtained through a court order. United States v. 
Skinner, 690 F.3d. 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012). 
86. Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 314-15. 
87. Id. at312-13. 
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Nevertheless, the court directed that a warrant "is an option to be 
used sparingly because Congress also included the option of a § 
2703(d) order.,,94 
In rejecting the government's claim that the warrant option only 
referred to the prosecutor's discretion to issue one form of process, 
the court noted: 
The Government's position would preclude magistrate 
judges from inquiring into the types of information that 
would actually be disclosed by a cell provider in response to 
the Government's request, or from making a judgment about 
the possibility that such disclosure would implicate the 
Fourth Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location 
information about the interior of a home.95 
Although concurring in the result and most of the reasoning, Judge 
Tashima wrote a concurring opinion that highlights some important 
points.96 Judge Tashima was concerned that the majority's opinion 
provided "no standards for the approval or disapproval of an 
application for an order under § 2703(d) ... [and] vest[ed] magistrate 
judges with ... uncabined discretion to grant or deny" the issuance of 
the order.97 Further, Judge Tashima was of the view 
that the magistrate may refuse to issue the § 2703(d) order 
here only if she finds that the government failed to present 
specific and articulable facts sufficient to meet the 
standard ... or, alternatively, finds that the order would 
violate the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of probable 
cause because it allows police access to information which 
reveals a cell phone user's location within the interior or 
curtilage of his home.98 
Additionally, Judge Tashima noted that the magistrate should be 
permitted to issue a conditional order requiring minimization of such 
information. 99 
A few months before the Third Circuit issued its opinion in the 
Sloviter decision, Magistrate Judge Austin in the Western District of 
Texas joined the growing list of magistrate judges to produce a 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 317. 
96. /d. at 319-21 (Tashima, 1., concurring). 
97. Id. at 320. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 320 n.lO. 
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lengthy opinion highlighting some of the legal issues permeating 
requests for orders under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).100 In addition to 
providing a summary of the case law to date,101 Judge Austin found 
that a cell phone is a "tracking device" under 18 U.S.c. § 3117(b) 
and held that the government's requests for CSLI, whether 
prospective or historical, would only be granted pursuant to a 
warrant based on probable cause as required by Rule 41.102 Judge 
Austin acknowledged that other courts had issued orders for CSLI 
using the SCA' s intermediate standard by distinguishing between 
CSLI from a single cell tower and CSLI from multiple towers 
allowing for triangulation (and greater precision) or GPS data.103 The 
judge concluded, however, that, due to advancing technology, these 
distinctions were "academic."I04 
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Austin highlighted an 
important-but rarely discussed-legal question: What does 
"probable cause" mean in the context of a warrant for CSLI? 105 
Judge Austin noted that in many warrant applications for CSLI, the 
typical statement of probable cause set forth in the affidavit provides: 
(1) there is evidence that the user of the target phone is 
dealing in narcotics; (2) there is evidence that the target 
phone is used in the narcotics dealing; and (3) being able to 
track the user's movements would assist in the investigation 
(for example, by helping to identify associates, stash houses, 
or sources of supply). 106 
The judge further explained, "On its face, this may seem adequate 
to support the issuance of a warrant for CSLI. On closer inspection, 
however, this conclusion is not so clear.,,107 Judge Austin then 
discussed the opinion of Magistrate Judge Facciola of the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, in which the judge 
declined to issue a warrant because the information sought was not 
100. See In re The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & 
Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; (3) 
Authorizing Disclosure of Location Based Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 572 (W.O. 
Tex. 2010) [hereinafter Austin Order]. 
101. See Id. at 573-75. 
102. Id. at 578-79,583-84 & n.21. 
103. Id. at 574. 
104. Id. at 580. 
105. Id. at 581. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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"evidence of a crime" but rather evidence that would be relevant and 
admissible in the criminal case. 108 Judge Austin then analyzed the 
parts of Rule 41 dealing with search and seizure of persons or 
property and warrants for tracking devices, as well as the case law on 
tracking devices. 109 Noting that "there are difficult questions 
presented by the probable cause determination on CSLI 
applications," to which the answers are not obvious, the judge 
fashioned a "cautious approach" pending "more guidance from 
Congress and the courts on [the] issues."llo Ultimately, Judge Austin 
held that a warrant for CSLI could be based on a showing of 
"probable cause to believe that tracking the phone will lead to 
evidence of a crime.,,111 Nevertheless, more is needed than evidence 
simply demonstrating that "a person has a cell phone and is engaged 
in criminal conduct.,,112 
The meaning of "probable cause" was raised again in a case before 
Magistrate Judge Gauvey in the District of Maryland. 113 In that case, 
the government sought prospective precise location information 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41, the SCA, and the All 
Writs Act (pertaining to the inherent authority of the court) in order 
to execute an arrest warrant. I 14 The government advanced two 
arguments for obtaining the information under the Fourth 
Amendment: first, that it was entitled to the information pursuant to 
the arrest warrant, and second, that it could seek a search warrant to 
obtain evidence in furtherance of apprehending the defendant. 115 
The court held that the arrest warrant alone did not authorize the 
government to obtain the location information, and a search warrant 
was not authorized since the government did not seek any 
infonnation that was evidence of a crime.116 Had the government 
provided evidence that the defendant was a fugitive and was fleeing 
to avoid prosecution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073, in which case 
the defendant's location would have been evidence of his crime of 
flight, a search warrant would have authorized. 117 In addition, 
although a search warrant could have been issued based on probable 
108. Id. at 581-82; see also In re The United States for an Order Authorizing the Release 
of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006). 
109. Austin Order, supra note 100, at 582-83. 
110. Id. at 583. 
III. Id. at 584. 
112. Id. 
113. Gauvey Order, supra note 8, at 530. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 535-36. 
116. Id. at 536. 
117. Id. at 537. 
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cause that the defendant was at a specific location,118 that was the 
very issue the government wished to resolve. 
In discussing a warrant for location information, the court noted a 
"vehement" disagreement between the parties about the nature of the 
requisite probable cause. 119 The government asserted that probable 
cause that the evidence sought would aid in the apprehension of the 
defendant was sufficient. 120 The Federal Public Defender's Office 
took the position that the government must establish a reasonable 
probability that the information sought constitutes proof of a crime, 
that is, that there must be a nexus between the item seized and the 
criminal behavior. 121 The court ultimately concurred with the 
defense. 122 
The court recognized the government's "laudable societal goal of 
bringing a charged defendant to justice," but the court deemed it "an 
exercise of police power neither clearly envisioned in the Fourth 
Amendment nor approved by the courts, in an area of quickly 
shifting, complex technology.,,123 In its discussion, the court noted 
that Professor Orin Kerr, in hearings in 2010 before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act reform, had raised the exact issue of the meaning of probable 
cause. 124 Professor Kerr had asked: 
... [PJrobable cause of what? Is that probable cause to 
believe the person tracked is guilty of a crime? Or is it 
probable cause to believe the evidence of location 
information obtained would itselfbe evidence of a crime? 
The difference is important. In the case of a search 
warrant, "probable cause" generally refers to probable 
cause to believe that the information to be obtained is itself 
evidence of a crime. But cell phone location information 
will itself be evidence of crime only in specific kinds of 
cases. For example, such information normally will not be 
evidence of a crime if investigators want to obtain the 
present location of someone who committed a past crime. 
118. Id. at 550. 
119. Id. at 560. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 560-61. 
122. Id.at561. 
123. Id. at 564. 
124. Id. at 560 (internal citations omitted). 
502 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
To see this, imagine the police have probable cause to arrest 
a criminal for a crime committed last week. The police 
want to locate the suspect in order to arrest him. In that 
case, the police will not have probable cause to believe that 
the location of the criminal's cell phone is itself evidence of 
a crime. The suspect's location a week after the crime 
occurred does not give the police any information indicating 
that the suspect did or did not commit the crime. But if the 
police have probable cause to arrest someone, and they 
know his cell-phone number, I would think the law should 
allow the government some way of locating the suspect 
pursuant to an appropriate court order. A requirement that 
location information be obtainable only based on probable 
cause to believe that the location information is itself 
evidence of a crime would not seem to allow that. 125 
The court further noted that although Professor Kerr had identified 
the issue, he did not offer any solution, nor did any lawmakers in 
proposed legislation that followed. 126 With respect to the SCA, the 
court joined other jurisdictions holding that where prospective, real-
time location information is sought, the cell phone is a tracking 
device and subject to the requirements of Rule 41 and the Fourth 
Amendment. 127 
The decision in United States v. Maynard, 128 and subsequent 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jones,129 resulted in 
courts revisiting the standards for access to historical CSLI. 
Magistrate Judge Orenstein, in the Eastern District of New York, was 
one of the first to question the appropriate standards for historical 
CSLI in light of the Maynard case. 130 Judge Orenstein had previously 
granted applications for historical CSLI under the intermediate SCA 
standard while requiring the government to establish probable cause 
in an application for prospective CSLL131 The Maynard decision 
disturbed the uniformity among the circuits-which did not require a 
warrant for tracking outside of the home-when it held that GPS 
125. Id. (quoting ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 39--40 (statement of Orin Kerr, 
Professor, George Washington University Law School)). 
126. Id. at 564. 
127. Id. at 577. 
128. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 554, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010), ajJ'd in part sub. nom. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
129. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,949 (2012). 
130. In re The United States for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-site Info., 
736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter Orenstein Order]. 
13l. Id. at 580. 
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tracking infonnation was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; thus, the judge was compelled to re-analyze the issue. 132 
Judge Orenstein reaffinned his prior conclusion that "as a statutory 
matter the SCA penn its a court to issue the order [for historical 
CSLI] without a showing of probable cause," but found the Maynard 
reasoning persuasive and the government's efforts to distinguish it 
from the instant case unavailing. 133 Accordingly, the judge held that 
the Fourth Amendment required a warrant based on probable 
cause. 134 
Next, Magistrate Judge Stephen William Smith in the Southern 
District of Texasl35 followed Judge Orenstein's suggestion that 
"courts re-examine the constitutionality of historical cell site requests 
in light of recent appellate court decisions," including Maynard. 136 In 
detennining consolidated requests for historical eSLI under the seA 
in three criminal investigations, Judge Smith held that, although he 
had previously granted such requests, the "earlier interpretation of the 
SCA is now constitutionally irnpennissible.,,137 Judge Smith began 
by documenting the vast developments in location technology in his 
"Findings of Fact.,,138 Since prior decisions allowing historical CSLI 
without a warrant relied on imprecise location data, Judge Smith 
observed that "the continuing vitality of those decisions must be 
doubted." 139 
The judge ultimately concluded that eSLI was "squarely within the 
protective ambit of United States v. Karo," because the eSLI would 
reveal infonnation about constitutionally protected spaces. 140 
Although finding that reliance on the Maynard case was not 
"essential," Judge Smith proceeded to analyze the case and concurred 
in Judge Orenstein's "holding that Maynard's prolonged surveillance 
doctrine precludes the Government from obtaining two months of 
cell phone tracking data without a warrant.,,141 Judge Smith, thus, 
based his decision that warrantless disclosure of CSLI violates the 
132. Id. at 581-82. 
133. Id. at 584-95. 
134. Id. at 579. 
135. See, e.g., In re The United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 
829 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
136. Id. at 830, 840. 
137. Id. at 829 & n.2. 
138. Id.at831-35. 
139. Id. at 837. 
140. Id. at 836-38. 
141. Id. at 838, 840. 
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Fourth Amendment on two independent grounds: Karo and 
Maynard. 142 
As noted by my colleague in Post-Jones: How District Courts Are 
Answering the Myriad Questions Raised by the Supreme Court's 
Decision in United States v. Jones, the decision left many questions 
unanswered. 143 The majority's decision, reverting to a trespass theory 
on physical property, does little to elucidate the implications of using 
CSLI in criminal investigations. Perhaps the best that might be 
gleaned is that the Court may revisit the third-party doctrine, which 
holds that a person loses her reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily revealed to third parties. 144 
Since Jones, courts analyzing access to historical CSLI have been 
reluctant to extend Fourth Amendment protections to such 
information. The court in United States v. Graham rejected the 
defendant's claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when the government obtained historical CSLI without a warrant 
based on probable cause.145 The court noted that prior decisions were 
divided among: (1) those which found that the Fourth Amendment 
was implicated and a showing of probable cause was required under 
certain circumstances, particularly if the information covered a 
sufficiently long period of time, thus implicating a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) decisions finding the 
SCA's intermediate standard sufficient regardless of the time period 
involved because the information constituted a business record held 
by third parties and voluntarily conveyed by the person. 146 The court 
highlighted two important distinctions between Maynard and the 
instant case. 147 First, Maynard involved real-time monitoring of the 
suspect's location as opposed to historical location information,148 
142. ld. at 846. Judge Smith also rejected the government's argument that the Fourth 
Amendment was not implicated because the records were voluntarily conveyed to the 
provider. ld. at 840-45. 
143. Jason D. Medinger, Post-Jones: How District Courts are Answering the Myriad of 
Questions Raised by the Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. Jones, 42 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 395 (2013). 
144. Compare United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,951-52 (2012), and United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-84, (1983), with Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
145. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385, 387, 389, 396--97, 406 (D. Md. 
2012). 
146. ld. at 388-89 (emphasis added). 
147. !d. at 391-92. 
148. ld. 
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and second, the SCA incorporates judicial review, which was not 
present in Maynard. 149 
In discussing the Jones case, the court concluded that although a 
five justice majority appeared "willing to accept the principle that 
government surveillance over time can implicate an individual's 
reasonable expectation of privacy... the factual differences 
[between the technologies] lead this [c ]ourt to proceed with caution 
in extrapolating too far from the Supreme Court's varied opinions in 
Jones."150 Because access to "historical [CSLI] did not involve a 
physical trespass," the court then proceeded to "analyze the Fourth 
Amendment implications of the [SCA] under the Katz test," as 
directed by the Jones case. 151 
After a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court and Fourth 
Circuit precedents, as well as the mosaic theory, the court concluded 
that the third-party doctrine applied to historical CSLI and that, as 
business records kept in the ordinary course of business, no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the records existed and no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred.152 In addition, the court analyzed 
and rejected the approach of Judge Garufis in the Eastern District of 
New York, who, in the wake of Maynard, found an exception to the 
third-party doctrine and held that the government was required to 
obtain a search warrant based on probable cause for historical 
CSLL I53 Most notably, Judge Bennett, while acknowledging Judge 
Alito's statement in Jones that "'the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy, '" went on to state: 
[T]he law as it now stands simply does not contemplate a 
situation whereby traditional surveillance becomes a Fourth 
149. Id. at 392. 
150. Id. at 394. 
151. Id. at 396. 
152. Id. at 400, 403; see also United States v. Ruby, No. 12CR1073(WQH), 2013 WL 
544888, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12,2013) (holding that the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in cell site information, which was voluntarily conveyed to a 
third party business); United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 
3095357, at *8-9 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (holding that the defendant had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in cell phone data that he voluntarily turned over to a 
third party). 
153. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 401; see also In re The United States for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 
(E.O.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that defendants have a sufficiently protected privacy 
interest in CSLI to warrant an exception to the third party doctrine). 
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Amendment "search" only after some specified period of 
time-discrete acts of law enforcement are either 
constitutional or they are not. ... The fact of the matter is 
that in enacting the Stored Communications Act, Congress 
passed a law that rejects a warrant requirement for this type 
of information, but does require specific and articulable 
facts to be determined by a judicial officer. 
Further, it is entirely unclear what the implications would 
be of an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that 
protects "cumulative" data collected by law enforcement. 
Taken to its logical extreme, such a reading would 
theoretically affect entire police investigations, and not just 
surveillance via cell site location data. In Jones, Justice 
Alito stated that "relatively short-term monitoring of a 
person's movements on public streets accords with 
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as 
reasonable," but goes on to conclude that "the line was 
surely crossed" when that monitoring continued for four 
weeks. If that is how the Fourth Amendment is to be 
interpreted, then the police could commit a constitutional 
violation by taking enough individually permissible steps, 
that in the aggregate, add up to a substantial amount of data 
being collected on a suspect-thereby infringing his 
reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, using only 
ordinary investigatory techniques, police can (and do) 
collect vast amounts of data on criminal suspects. After 
interviewing witnesses, conducting surveillance (perhaps 
enhanced by discrete requests for historical cell site location 
records under the Stored Communications Act), and 
reviewing pen registers and bank records, police may be 
able to paint an "intimate picture" of a person's life. Under 
the mosaic theory, at some point this collection of data 
would become a Fourth Amendment search at some 
undefined point. 154 
More succinctly, as pointed out by Professor Kerr, "[T]he mosaic 
theory has the bizarre consequence of creating retroactive 
unconstitutionality.,,155 
Finally, two other points made by the court are worth mentioning. 
First, the court noted that "even if cell site records could definitively 
154. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 401(first emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
155. ld. at 402. 
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indicate that an individual is in his home, that information only 
reveals that a person made or received a phone call while at home-
in other words, non-incriminatory information that is clearly 
obtainable via the ... pen register.,,156 Second, the court highlighted 
the importance of legislative-not judicial-solutions to privacy 
concerns stemming from rapidly developing technologies. 157 
Since Jones, other courts have come to the same conclusion that 
historical CSLI records are afforded no Fourth Amendment 
protection. 158 Magistrate Judge Collings, in the District of 
Massachusetts, recently revisited the issue in light of Jones. 159 
Noting that probable cause had not been required for such records 
since Judge Steams' decision in 2007, Judge Collings nevertheless 
wrote to highlight the difficult question of what constitutes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in our electronic age and the 
eventual and inevitable resolution by either the Supreme Court or 
Congress. l60 Judge Collings concluded that the best approach was 
counseled by Judge Bennett in Graham, who had relied on the 
Supreme Court's caution that the judiciary should not prematurely 
elaborate on Fourth Amendment implications in the wake of 
emerging technology. 161 Thus, Judge Collings reiterated that Judge 
Steams' opinion would be followed "[ u ]ntil either the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court rule [ s] otherwise, or 
Congress enacts legislation dealing with the problem.,,162 
As noted previously, after the Maynard decision, Magistrate Judge 
Smithl63 revisited the constitutionality of applications for historical 
CSLI and concluded that warrantless disclosure of CSLI violates the 
Fourth Amendment. The district court subsequently adopted Judge 
156. Id. at 404. 
157. Id. at 404-05 ("When technology is in flux, Fourth Amendment protections should 
remain relatively modest until the technology stabilizes .... [T]he legislative branch 
rather than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology 
is changing.") (quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 805--06 
(2004)). 
158. See, e.g., United States v. Ruby, No. 12CRI073(WQH), 2013 WL 544888, at *6 (S.D. 
Cal. Feb. 12,2013); United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, 
at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012). 
159. In re The United States for an Order Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 
2703(D) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 
2012). 
160. Id. at 178. 
161. Id. at 179. 
162. Id. 
163. See supra text and accompanying notes 119-120. 
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Smith's ruling that § 2703(d) orders for CSLI are unconstitutional 
and the government appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 164 The Fifth Circuit 
issued its opinion on July 30, 2013, while this article was pending 
publication. 165 
The Fifth Circuit began by disagreeing with the Third Circuit's 
conclusion that the court has discretion to deny the government's 
request for a court order based on the lesser SCA standard and 
require a warrant based on probable cause.166 As to the constitutional 
question, the court found that CSLI constitutes business records of 
voluntarily conveyed information and therefore is not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. 167 
Finally, the court acknowledged that technological advances can 
impact reasonable expectations of privacy but expressly declined to 
create its own rule contrary to the legislative solution enacted in the 
SCA. 168 The court instead decided the case on the narrow grounds 
before it holding that "Section 2703( d) orders to obtain historical 
[CSLI] for specified cell phones at the points at which the user places 
and terminates a call are not categorically unconstitutional.,,169 
V. FINDING THE BALANCE 
"When criminals use modem technological devices to carry out 
criminal acts and to reduce the possibility of detection, they can 
hardly complain when the police take advantage of the inherent 
characteristics of those very devices to catch them.,,17o It is hard to 
argue with the fundamental principle in Judge Rogers' statement. In 
United States v. Skinner, Judge Rogers held that there was simply no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI at issue in the case. 171 
The district court had affirmed Magistrate Judge Guyton's opinion 
and concurred in his analysis of the issues.172 The district court held, 
"[A]ssuming that a search occurred when the government utilized 
cell-site data to locate and track defendant's vehicle as it traveled 
164. In re The United States for historical cell site data, 724 F.3d 600,605 (5th Cir. 2013). 
165. In re The United States for historical cell site data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013). 
166. Id. at 604-05. 
167. Id. at 606-09. 
168. Id. at 609. 
169. Id. 
170. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2012). 
171. Id. 
172. United States v. Skinner, No. 3:06-CR-100, 2007 WL 1556596 at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 
24,2007). 
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upon public highways, the defendant lacked standing to assert a 
Fourth Amendment protected interest in the cell phone data .... ,,173 
The case, involving an extensive marijuana drug trafficking 
organization, is a model for the criminal use of cell phones. The 
source of the marijuana bought pay-as-you-go cell phones with false 
names and addresses, programmed them with the criminal cohorts' 
contact information, and distributed them to the couriers and other 
participants. 174 They routinely discarded them and obtained new ones 
with different numbers in different names. 175 The source did not 
know that the phones were equipped with GPS technology.176 The 
ultimate demise of the organization occurred when one of the phones 
was identified in a wiretap interception as used by a courier soon to 
be en route with a load of marijuana. 177 Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents obtained a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(d) and tracked the phone as it traveled across the country with 
drugs, ultimately intercepting it in Texas en route to Tennessee.178 
No one can question that extensively detailed-geographical and 
temporal-real-time, or hist0l1cai location information in the hands 
of law enforcement, or non-governmental entities for that matter, 
raises legitimate privacy concerns. At the same time, the courts and 
Congress alike have frequently recognized that law enforcement 
investigative interests and needs in furtherance of protecting the 
public should not be unduly hindered but rather carefully balanced 
with the privacy interests of the public it serves. 179 There is also little 
question that rapid technological developments over the last two 
decades provide increasingly sophisticated tools that can further both 
criminality and law enforcement efforts seeking to interdict that 
criminality in the interest of public safety and the reduction of violent 
cnme. 
The federal magistrate judges revi~wing requests for orders for 
CSLI have grappled with these issues in an ever changing landscape 
of highly technical information and in the wake of Maynard's 
173. Id. 
174. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 776. 
178. Id. 
179. See, e.g., Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 587; ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 4-5; 
s. REp. 99-541, at 5 (1986). 
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recogmtlOn that real-time, highly accurate monitoring over an 
extended time period potentially reveals sensitive details about a 
person's life. The courts' efforts have been further exacerbated by 
the very nature of CSLI data, which can lead to uncertainty and 
confusion about the precision of the location information sought by 
the government as an initial matter and the specific information 
ultimately available for production by the cellular service provider. 180 
The resulting jurisprudence, while frequently thorough and 
thoughtful, is largely unsettled. Courts have become increasingly 
wary, and rightfully so, about Fourth Amendment implications 
arising from intensive real-time or historical monitoring over 
extended periods of time. Yet the courts are cautious about straying 
too far from the guidance in Jones in addressing Fourth Amendment 
concerns arising from emerging technology. lSI 
The role of the courts in granting law enforcement access to 
potentially intrusive techniques will forever remain a fact-driven 
analysis in which the courts must engage. The variable nature of 
CSLI and its rapidly developing technology add additional elements 
to the shifting fact-based analysis the courts will continue to be 
saddled with in evaluating government requests for CSLI. 
Nevertheless, the courts and law enforcement would significantly 
benefit from legislative clarification of static issues, such as whether 
a cell phone can ever be a tracking device within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 3117. Moreover, legislation could address whether 
prospective and real-time CSLI are obtainable under a § 2703( d) 
order, as well as the government's burden in acquiring such CSLI. 
Whether prospective or historical CSLI is at issue, courts and 
Congress should be cautious in requiring a warrant based on probable 
cause without a thorough analysis of the issues and ramifications. In 
oral argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in In Re: Application of the United States for Historical Cell 
Site Data, the court asked the government why it could not simply 
180. See supra text and accompanying notes 20-24 (discussing how the cell site density 
impacts the precision of data); e.g., Owsley Order, supra note 33, at *1, 4 (criticizing 
government for not understanding the technology in CSLI applications); In Re The 
United States for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-20884, Oral Arguments (Oct. 2, 
2012), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgumentRecordings.aspx 
(judge questions what CSLI information is actually requested pursuant to § 2703(d) 
application for order). 
181. See supra notes 141-145 (discussing Graham and other post-Jones decisions). 
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seek a warrant. 182 Counsel for the government noted that a warrant 
would require probable cause that the search would reveal evidence 
of a crime whereas the CSLI order would only require the 
government to provide specific and articulable facts that the 
information would be relevant and material to the investigation.183 
The government then offered the hypothetical example of a 
kidnapping where the parents had suspicions or concerns about a 
particular individual. 184 Assuming the parents could point to some 
specific facts underpinning the concerns, the government could meet 
the latter standard but not the former. 185 Another example discussed 
by the government involved a case in which, although the CSLI was 
only accurate to within a few blocks, the CSLI confirmed that the 
suspect traveled to another town to steal cars for use in the crime.186 
Yet another frequent example arises during the early stages of an 
investigation when law enforcement agents have viable leads about 
an individual's illegal activity but have very little information with 
which to identify the suspect, perhaps merely a nickname, cell phone 
number, and general area of operation. CSLI could confirm the 
suspect's identity and lead to other relevant evidence or exonerate the 
suspect. 
These examples involve historical, prospective, and real-time CSLI, 
without which the investigations could be significantly hindered. In 
the kidnapping example, the use of CSLI could make the difference 
between the successful recovery of the victim unharmed and 
otherwise. There are no doubt other examples in which the warrant 
standard cannot be met and its application will unduly hinder law 
enforcement. 
Even if Congress or the courts conclude that the higher 
warrant/probable cause standard should be imposed on the 
government's requests for CSLI, access to CSLI will be available 
only in limited circumstances absent a clarification of "probable 
cause" in this context. As noted above, Magistrate Judge Austin 
confronted this problem and ultimately held that the warrant for CSLI 
182. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-20884, Oral Arguments (Oct. 
2, 2012), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.goy/OraiArgumentRecordings.aspx 
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would be issued based on probable cause that the information would 
lead to evidence of a crime. 187 Modification of the warrant/probable 
cause standard in an era of rapid technological change could lead to a 
watering down of the standard. 
Many of the issues raised by law enforcement's use of precise CSLI 
are not subject to a simple fix. Whether applying a warrant/probable 
cause standard or the lesser § 2703( d) standard, judicial oversight is 
required for the release of CSLI. This provides the requisite neutral 
determination to protect Fourth Amendment rights. As noted above, 
the Third Circuit held that a court may approve the request on the 
lesser standard or ask the government to meet a probable cause 
standard. 188 This may be the wisest approach and would allow further 
development of the law in this complex area. Given the fact-
intensive nature of either determination, federal magistrate judges 
will always be engaged in this process. It is incumbent upon the 
government to come to the court with the best information it can 
obtain about the CSLI available from the service providers and to 
limit its requests to time periods reasonable to accomplish its 
investigative goals. Further, the government needs to assuage the 
court's concerns by providing proactive minimization procedures to 
acknowledge and address potential capturing of CSLI in protected 
areas that are irrelevant to the investigation or of individuals that are 
unrelated to the investigation. 189 By proactively applying 
prophylactic measures and requesting reasonable temporal data, the 
government and courts can work together-at least in the short 
term-to strike the balance between reasonable government access to 
critical investigative information and legitimate privacy concerns. 
187. See supra text accompany note 106. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 85-94. In addition, a consolidated appeal of 
several of Magistrate Smith's denials of applications for 2703(d) orders is pending 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Case No. 11-20884. 
189. See Owsley Order, supra note 33, at *4 (criticizing the government for not articulating 
a plan for the data captured related to innocent persons). 
